Friday, February 6, 2009

New Sport Philosophy and Reasonable Expectations

Recently, we've seen several contributions to the philosophy of sport literature from philosophers who made their names elsewhere. Three cases in point are Michael Sandel's The Case Against Perfection, Gumbrecht's In Praise of Athletic Beauty, and most recently, Colin McGinn's Sport. I always experience keen anticipation as I order, open up, and begin to read such books. The excitement comes, I suppose, from knowing the excellent work that such individuals have produced in the past and the expectation that their analyses will enlighten me in exceptional ways. Invariably, however, I end up disappointed. Perhaps my expectations were unreasonable.

One factor, however, that seems to be a constant in such first-time volumes is a lack of background research by the author. Well-known, mainline philosophers who choose to turn their attention to sport for the first time, in other words, rarely do their homework. They do not bother to see what has already been written on the topic. They do not properly cite authors who made identical (and very well-known) claims years ago. From all indications, they are not even aware of the scholarly journals that exist in the area. When they offer recommendations for future reading, their suggestions are typically pathetic.

Of course, from this it does not necessarily follow that their work is not at all worthy. Indeed, there are parts of the aforementioned books that are quite good. But this practice is bothersome. It is bothersome because it would seem that a first step for any scientist who comes upon what is, for that person, a new problem is one of finding out what is already known about that very issue.

Thus, a question: Does any philosopher who is entering a new arena have an obligation to do some homework before putting his or her name to a publication? Is that a reasonable expectation or not?

Scott Kretchmar
Penn State

Thursday, February 5, 2009

Prolegomenon: Hunting as Sport

Most people are familiar with the long-standing criticisms of sport hunting. For example, in “A Damnable Pleasure,” Joseph Wood Krutch’s polemical critique of hunters and hunting, Krutch writes:
The killer for sport has no . . . comprehensible motive. He prefers death to life, darkness to light. He gets nothing except the satisfaction of saying, “Something which wanted to live is dead. There is that much less vitality, consciousness, and, perhaps, joy in the universe. I am the Spirit that Denies.”
To which Krutch adds, “To me it is inconceivable how anyone should think an animal more interesting dead than alive. I can also easily prove to my own satisfaction that killing ‘for sport’ is the perfect type of pure evil for which the metaphysicians have sometimes sought . . . ” (Krutch 1969, 148). Anti-hunters like Krutch commonly argue that hunting is unjustifiable because it is violent, unethical, and barbaric. Hunters enjoy a "damnable pleasure" that is pure evil. (Hell, while we’re at it—hunters are pure evil.)

Joy Williams’s essay, “The Killing Game,” is a similarly dramatic ad hominem against hunters. “The American hunter is blood-thirsty, piggish, and grossly incompetent," Williams writes. The main problem with recreational hunting, she argues, is simply the fact that hunters “kill for play, for the thrill of it.”

Therefore, "it’s time to stop actively supporting and passively allowing hunting and time to stigmatize it."
Hunters’ self-serving arguments and lies are becoming more preposterous as nonhunters awake from their long, albeit troubled, sleep. Sport hunting is immoral; it should be made illegal. Hunters are persecutors of nature who should be prosecuted. They wield a disruptive power out of all proportion to their numbers, and pandering to their interests–the special interests of a group that just wants to kill things–is mad. It’s preposterous that every year less than 7 percent of the population turns the skies into shooting galleries and the woods and fields into abattoirs. It’s time to stop being conned and cowed by hunters, time to stop pampering and coddling them, time to get them off the government’s duck-and-deer dole, time to stop thinking of wild animals as “resources” and “game,” and start thinking of them as sentient beings that deserve our wonder and respect, time to stop allowing hunters to be creditable by calling it “sport” and “recreation.” Hunters make wildlife dead, dead, dead. It’s time to wake up to this indisputable fact. As for hunters, it’s long past check-out time (Williams 1990, 265).
It’s pretty clear that Williams dislikes both hunting and hunters!

In contrast I believe that recreational sport hunting pursued for its own sake is morally justifiable. What’s more, I specifically embrace the use of the terms ‘recreational’ or ‘sport’ hunting to defend hunting. The reality of recreational sport hunting is that hunters are motivated not by need or utility but by a desire for the pleasures and enjoyment of the hunt. When viewed in this way, in this specifically non-utilitarian or even aesthetic sense, sport hunting can be interpreted, defended, and justified as an art form.

The idea of calling sport hunting an art form is not crazy. In a thoughtful book about boxing, for example, novelist Joyce Carol Oates speaks of “the awareness of life’s tragic ambiguity that serious art provides” and argues that the sport of boxing is a serious art (Oates 1994, 137). In a similar book about bullfighting, Bruce Schoenfeld writes, "Bullfighting at its best forces everyone who sees it to become keenly aware of his own mortality, which arguably should ennoble his being and enhance his life. It's serious stuff" (Schoenfeld 1992, 91).

Exactly. Hunting is serious stuff as well. As a voluntary leisure activity hunting has the potential to ennoble one’s being and enhance the lives of those who practice it.

One of the problems with discussing hunting today is the terminology we use. Traditionally, the term ‘sportsman’ has conveyed the normative side of recreational hunting by helping make distinctions about fair and unfair methods of hunting. But more recently, the very idea of the hunting as a sport has itself been called into question. Some defenders of hunting believe that the use of the term ‘sport’ to describe hunting trivializes hunting. Others respond by saying that justifications of hunting as sport should be abandoned in favor of utilitarian justifications such as food-getting.

The term ‘sport’ however continues to convey accurately the sense of sporting ethics that has distinguished non-subsistence hunting as a recreational activity for thousands of years. Abandoning the term ‘sport’—or, at the very least, forgetting the reasons why hunting should be classified a sport—would be a mistake in my view.

It may just be that conceptualizing hunting as a sport provides the only possible basis for a meaningful hunting ethics. Aldo Leopold argues that hunting for sport is an "improvement" over hunting for food because the entire notion of "sport" brings with it not only an emphasis on skill but also an ethical code that hunters must uphold "without the moral support of bystanders" (Leopold 1933 (1986), 391). Those who argue that hunting is best defended as a means to getting food are left without a rationale for why hunting should be conducted in an ethical or sporting manner as opposed to the most efficient or expedient manner.

We might also consider the question asked by José Ortega y Gasset in Meditations on Hunting: Does hunting have an essence? Even though many philosophers tend toward skepticism about "essences" of anything, hunting as a concept helps organize different human experiences and identify what is common to all of them. The philosophic literature on play, games, and sport, provides a theoretical basis or framework for understanding what Ortega refers to as the "essence" of hunting. Is play or "sport" the essence of hunting? There are good reasons for believing so.

Tuesday, February 3, 2009

Equity of prize money in tennis...

Although it's not a particularly new area of debate, David Edmonds on the University of Oxford Practical Ethics blog has recently written a post arguing against the claim that women and men should receive the same prize money in tennis. His main syllogism is that prize money should be dependent on ability, men have greater ability than women, therefore men should receive more prize money than women. He does concede that there is a degree of personal interest involved in his claim in that any counter-argument resting on the premise that women should receive extra advantage in their 'handicap' [my word not his] by virtue of sex, would descriminate against him as a less tennis-abled man.

Take a look at his post and get the discussion going...

 

Friday, January 30, 2009

Conference Announcement & Call for Abstracts:

*Sport & Technology: Philosophical Dimensions*
Friday, May 29, 2009 - Sunday, May 31, 2009

Keynote Speakers:
Dr. William J. Morgan, University of Southern California
Dr. W. Miller Brown, Trinity College

Hosted by Continuing Studies & the Department of Philosophy Langara College Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada

Conference Information:
The world has witnessed the breaking of world and Olympic records in unheralded numbers in recent years. Advances in training, equipment, doping substances and methods, and potentially even genetic engineering have apparently changed sport from its historical origins. These events invite philosophical discussion and analysis of the ethical dimensions of the use of these new technologies and, also, of their broader implications for the conception of sport itself. Some questions that should be asked include: What role does technology play in sport, and what role ought it to play? What responsibilities do sport governing bodies have over the regulation of technology in their individual sports? Ought cutting-edge technology be available to all competitors, or is the design and utilization of technology a legitimate component of strategy within sport? Is some technology acceptable, and other not? What is the threshold for acceptable technological advantage? What is the moral difference, if any, between the use of technology to aid performance in sport and the use of performance enhancing drugs? The conference aims to open philosophical dialogue on these and other topics related to technology and sport.

We invite participation on any topic that addresses the philosophical dimensions of technology in sport. Papers on other topics related to philosophy of sport will also be considered and will be accepted if there is room on the conference agenda.

Articles submitted in full by April 15th will be considered for publication in a special fall 2009 issue of The Journal of Philosophy of Sport.

Please submit abstracts (250 – 400 words) electronically to all listed below:
Dr. John S. Russell, jrussell@langara.bc.ca
Dr. Gabriela Tymowski, gabi@unb.ca
gabi@unb.ca
Dr. Angela Schneider, aschneid@uwo.ca aschneid@uwo.ca

Abstract Deadline: March 1st, 2009 (note extension)
Notification of Acceptance: By March 15th, 2009

Registration: Form available at http://www.langara.bc.ca/cs/media/pdfs/register.pdf . Conference fee is $100 Cdn. ($65 Cdn for students enrolled in a post-secondary program). Indicate under "Course" that you are enrolling in "Sport and Technology: Philosophical Dimensions." The course code is 60580. See www.langara.bc.ca for information about Langara College. The conveners will send further information to registrants, including plans for a golf tournament (the College adjoins a golf course), seawall runs and/or a hike up Grouse Mountain, and a dinner.
Accommodation:


A block of rooms has been reserved at the Plaza 500 Hotel, which is a short bus trip to Langara College and close to downtown. Call 1-800-473-1811. Room rates are $139 Cdn/night. (The Canadian dollar is currently $.81 US.) http://www.plaza500.com/

For further information:
Dr. John S. Russell
Chair, Dept. of Philosophy
Langara College
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
V5Y 2E4
604-323-5453

Tuesday, January 27, 2009

100-0, with Honor?

The coach of a Texas high school basketball team that beat another team 100-0 was fired Sunday, the same day he sent an e-mail to a newspaper saying he will not apologize "for a wide-margin victory when my girls played with honor and integrity."

Given that I didn't witness the contest, I can't say a lot beyond speculation about the ethics of this particular scenario. However, it does seem to me that playing with honor and integrity would involve not taking 3 point shots in the 4th quarter of such a lopsided game. Sport philosophers Nicholas Dixon and Randolph Feezell have offered arguments about this type of situation. Dixon argues against a received view concerning sportspersonship that he calls the Anti-Blowout thesis:

It is intrinsically unsporting for players or teams to maximize the margin of victory after they have secured victory in a one-sided contest.

One of the strongest points in favor of his view raised by Dixon is that it is not true that those who suffer lopsided defeats have been humiliated or diminished as humans. The only cause for shame in such a situation would be giving up, if one is on the losing side. And in a competitive game, when part of the purpose is a determination of athletic superiority and excellence, there is nothing immoral about running up the score. (For more, see Dixon's "On Sportsmanship and Running Up the Score'," Journal of the Philosophy of Sport (1992): 1-13).

On the other side of this issue, Feezell argues that even if it isn't always wrong to run up the score, it usually is and strong overriding factors must be present if the following Revised Anti-Blowout Thesis is to be overridden:

It is prima facie unsporting for players or teams to maximize the margin of victory after they have secured victory in a one-sided contest.

For more, see Randolph Feezell, "Sportsmanship and Blowouts: Baseball and Beyond," Journal of the Philosophy of Sport (1999): 68-78. Both papers are also reprinted in Sports Ethics, edited by Jan Boxill.

Given the above principles and the ESPN account, was it wrong to run up the score?

Wednesday, January 14, 2009

Can Straight Shooters Use Beta Blockers?


What if some athletes were prevented from performing to their full potential because they were abnormally nervous in front of big crowds? Mastering the mental aspects of competitive sport is integral to being a true champion, but what about uncontrollable nervous reactions, like sweaty palms or nervous twitches? Carl Elliot asks whether Beta Blockers, which were used by two North Korean pistol shooters at the recent Olympic Games, can be classified in the same way as steroids or human growth hormone in this piece in The Atlantic:

http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200808u/beta-blockers

What do you all think?

Thursday, January 8, 2009

14th annual Congress of the European College of Sport Science

ECSS Congress in Oslo, June 24-27 2009
From June 24 to June 27 2009, The Norwegian School of Sport Sciences will organize the 14th annual Congress of the European College of Sport Science in Oslo, Norway. This is a multi-disciplinary congress that gathers between 1500 and 2000 scholars from all sport science fields and from all over the world.


Please check out the Congress home page on
http://www.ecss-congress.eu/OSLO2009/
Dead line for abstract submission is February 15th 2009.